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SUMMARY
ApaÉ from the work of an occasional investigator, comparative
religion has not been in contact with the psychology of the
unconscious in general, and with the complex or analytical
psychology of Jung in particular. In the foregoing study the
author has endeavoured to prove that there is no methodological
reason whatever to justify this aloofness, and that on the contrary
comparative religion, on the strength of its own presumptions,
ought to establish this contact. The relation between these two
branches of science has been studied especiaily in the work of the
two great pioneers, G. van der Leeuw and C. G. Jung.
A historical introduction emphasizes the fact that comparative
religion, which originated as a factor and as a symptom of the
conflict between natural religion and revealed religion during
the ,,Aufklárung", still participates in the process of spiritual
fermentation of the twentieth century. As comparative religion
sprang from theology, thus psychology originated from philosophy.
Both branches of learning have drifted away from their origins,
along rational and empirical lines, and as specialisms they attempt
to give an objective account of a part of reality. Finally, however,
they both end in a doctrine about man trying to find ,,le sens de
la vie". (P. Diel); for in both of them man is subject as well as
object.
Chapter IIA outlines Van der Leeuw's methodology which is based
on the theory of ,,Verstehen", as elaborated by Jaspers and
Spranger. On these grounds Van der Leeuw criticises psychoanalysis,
largely rejecting it, while leaving complex psychology out of
consideration. Therefore it must be investigated into whether
,,Verstehen" is actually inconsistent with the methods of depth
psychology.
To this end Chapter IIB contains a critical examination of
Jaspers's absolute distinction between,,Verstehen" and,,Erkláren".
Like Roffenstein, Van der Hoop, Walter Schweizer and others, the
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rop, Walter Schweizer and others, the
present author imagines he can demonstrate the essential similarity
of the two methods, which differ only relatively, and points out the
direct connection between Jaspers's methodological dualism and
the dualism of his ,,Philosophie". Like the ,,Erkláren", the ,,Ver*
stehen" tries to establish the unity and regularity of phenomena,
and therefore also abstracts those phenomena, and needs induction
as well as intuition. Then the concept ,,Sinn" is discussed, which
Jaspers, but especially Spranger and Anna Tumarkin consider to be
constitutive. However, the element of finality implied in this
concept does not in itself constitute any difference between
,,Verstehen" and ,,Erklàren": final relations also occur in biology,
in cases where it is impossible to speak of ,,Verstehen". The concept
,,Sinn", however, implies the ,,inner contact" between the knowing
subject and the known object, which is a result of what Van der
Leeuw calls ,,1'insertion du phénomène dans notre vie propre".
Man can never objectify himself completely, and therefore he can
never completely ,,erklàren" himself. Therefore the ,,Erkláren"
gradually changes into ,,Verstehen" when one passes upwards
from one psychic layer into the other. ,,Erkláren" is finally defined
as ,,demonstration of causal and final relations in phenomena";
,,Verstehen" is described as ,,the demonstration of final relations,
inserted into one's own life, in human phenomena".
In Chapter IIC the author criticises Spranger for repeatedly
disregarding ,,1'insertion du phénomène dans notre vie propre"
in order to be able, for the sake of objectivity, to speak of
,,Verstehen" also in connection with e.g. a machine. The
consequences of carrying in this way teleology into the metaphysical
field, culminating in an ,,objektiver Geist", are rejected as untenable
Platonic and neo-Kantian postulates: ,,die Metaphysik des Quasi-
Seins einer begrifflichen fdeenwelt" (Paul Hofmann). In this
connection Spranger's thesis, that psychology of religion is possible
only when it has been established ,,worin der ewige Sinn cler
Religion besteht", is emphatically rejected. Spranger's philosophy
is found to lead to a methodological Eleatism. The author, on
the other hand, imagines he can prove that the ,,Verstehen" does
not gain its object by means of metaphysical abstractions, but
through the concrete human phenomena which become part of the
individual life before one starts abstracting. The phenomenological
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object lies in between the pure subject and the pure object. By
means of the concept ,,phenomenological distance" (both in space
and in time) the author then endeavours to demonstrate that
,,Verstehen" means,,realisation": bringing into .consciousness.
In this way the point of contact between phenomenology of religion
and psychology of the unconsious becomes obvious. This thesis
is illustrated by examples from the history of religion. From them
it appears that the Western investigator must descend to the
common foundation of the human psyche: the unconscious, and
from there follow the course of development taken by e.g. the
Buddhist (as distinct from the Christian). Finally there is a
digression on the importance of the stratification theory in biology,
as elaborated especially by Nicolai Hartmann, for psychology.
,,Einer Stufung der Prinzipien nach Sinngebieten stehen keine
prinzipiellen Schwierigkeiten entgegen." (Magdalena Aebi).
Chapter III discusses the relation between Freud's psychoanalysis
and the study of religion. The main objection to Freud - without
whom, indeed, all psychology of the unconscious is inconceivable -
is that with him phenomena have to yield to theory, as Freud
has no eye for the stratification of the psyche and the autonomy
of the different layers. Freud ,,does not explain the world, he
explains it away". After generally comparing the psychological
systems of Freud and Jung and opposing Carl Clemen's ,,Die
Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf Mythologie und Religions-
geschichte", the author views the methods of phenomenology of
religion (Van der Leeuw) side by side with those of psychoanalysis
(Ernest Jones) and complex psychology (JunS), rvith the help of/a concrete example from the study of religion, viz., rebirth. Finally,
i in order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, the distinction
, between psychoanalysis as a negative Jewish psychology, and
'' 
complex psychology as a positive, ,,Aryan" psychology - a
; distinction of which several representatives of complex psychology
i have been guilty - is unconditionally rejecterl.
/ A lady love will be found to possess certain categories which
will be looked for in vain in a Protozoon. Nobody has the right
to call a castration complex real, as against the unreal character
of a rebirth, as the Freudians do, just as little as it is permissible
to call the former organism unreal as compared with the latter.
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This is the line taken in Chapter IV, which deals with the relation
between complex psychology and comparative religion. Jung has
a phenomenological respect for psychical phenomena and their
stratification. For this reason his work is very important to the
study of religion. The intrinsic and historic connection between
psychotherapy and certain forms of religion is pointed out, and in
this connection Jung's dream theory is discussed; the symbol is
not determined by the unconscious censor only, but is equally the
original expression of the psyche. ,,Das Symboi ist álter als der
latente Gedanke" (P. R. Hofstátter). Secondly it is pointed out
that Jung does justice to religious phenomena as focused on an
objective reality. In this connection the hypothesis of the collective
unconscious, which, for that matter, is still debatable, is upheld
as the only hypothesis in psychology which does not denature
religious phenomena, and yet places them in a comprehensible
relation. Further, it is shown that in connection with Rudolf
Otto's famous study, the ambivalent character of ,,das Heilige"
shows to full advantage in complex psychology. Eliade's opinion
that this ambivalence lies outside the reach of psychology is
contested. In the third place it is demonstrated that not
only do Jung's ideas about myth comply with all conditions of
phenomenology, but they also offer an opportunity to understand
the great variety of myths rvhich so far had remained an unsolved
problem in the study of religion. With a view to this question the
archetypes are discussed. In doing this the author emphasizes the
fact that again and again Jung tackles the problem of the archetypes
because there are lacts compelling him to do so. As long as
Freudianism cannot account for those facts without a metabasis
eis allo genos and with respect for the autonomy of religious
phenomena, Jung's doctrine of archetypes, which certainly should
be studied more closely, is a valuable working hypothesis, giving
numerous phenomena a comprehensible relation.
Herbert Silberer's investigations with regard to material and
functional symbolism have been used to provide the theoretical
background to Jung's phenomenological attitude; in this connection
mention is made of such concepts as introversion, sublimation and
finality, i.a. in connection with the investigations of Dalbiez,
Binswanger, Baynes and Jung. They are discussed against the
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background of the stratification theory: ,,fn stepping up from one
level to the other we always gain in qualities, because the whole
is always more than its parts. . . We must know where we are,
which level we are talking about, and not draw. unwarranted
conclusions either upwards or downwards." (Szent-Gyórgr). Ernest
Jones' and Otto Hoffmann's objections against Silberer's work
are critically discussed.
In doing this we are faced with the question whether the
transition from material to functional symbolism occurs only with
consciously directed introversions - as might be concluded from
Silberer's investigations and is therefore a late cultural
phenomenon, or if this transition also occurs unconsciously in more
recent stages of development. It appears from a study of primitive
thought and religions, for which the work of Van der Leeuw,
Lévy-Bruhl and John Layard had been used, that functional
symbolism may also be observed in early stages of the human race.
In this connection much attention has been paid to Erich
Neumann's important \Mork,,,IJrsprungsgeschichte des Bewusst-
seins". Meanwhile a closer study of the correlation between ontogeny
and phylogeny from a psychological point of view appears to be
most desirable.
Mircea Eliade's criticism of the psychology of the unconscious is
opposed in a separate part; his arguments are metaphysical, and
have no connection with psychology. After surveying the work
done bv ,,complex psychologists" in the field of the history of
religion, the author endeavours to prove that complex psychology,
as a synthetic psychology, creates the possibility of a synthesis
in the well-known controversies and tensions of the history of
religion: animism-manism, history of religion and phenomenology
of religion (referring to Neumann's archetypical,,sequence-dating"),
objective religion and subjective religiosity, rite and myth.
Finally, Chapter V deals with some marginal questions between
psychology and anthropology (as logos of man about man). The
author distinguishes between descriptive and designating anthro-
pology, and emphasizes the fact that psychology only provides
one aspect of descriptive anthropology. For this reason biology,
ethnology, medical anthropology, etc. must not be neglected.
Philosophy can summarize these aspects as much as possible,
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se aspects as much as Possible,
and in this summary it may accentuate and deepen the image of
man. An important step in this direction is ,,Die drei Stufen des
Organischen und der Mensch", by Helmuth Plessner. Jung's
archetypes are important from the point of view of descriptive
anthropology. There is a curious connection between Plessner's
concept of human ,,Positonalitát der exzentrischen Form" and
Jung's ,,Selbst", which opens remarkable perspectives.
Meanwhile all descriptive anthropology passes into a project,
for the description of any aspect of humanity shows man to be an
incomplete being. As no one can scientifically survey and master
all aspects of anthropology, and as, moreover, the project is a
matter of the future, all projectional anthropology is in essence
literature. Anthropologists are often unsuccessful poets, who build
a skeleton where true poets created a ,,flesh and blood image".
Two anthropological concepts, ,,play" and ,,freedom", are next
discussed. A consciousness of freedom means a consciousness of
possibilities, ,,Verstehen" appears to be an attempt by man to realise
undeveloped possibilities, to complete himself, directly or indirectly.
This brings us back to our starting point of Chapter I, which has
now been explained. In the ,,verstehende Religionswissenschaft"
the West tries to cure itself of its onesidedness, in order to attain
human completeness.
It would seem as if this totalitarian character of the ,,Verstehen",
which uses not only the ratio but all human cognitive qualities,
emperils the scientific character of science. In the first place, how-
ever, the psyche is not rational per se, but ,,vieldeutig". Secondly,
psychic facts are experiences, and as all knowledge is derived from
experience, and all science is based on experience, science will
have to subordinate ratio to experience in stead of vice versa.
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